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          Foreword“Engineers must study not only what technologies can do FOR people
but also what they do TO people,
and they must learn to steer technology
more sensitively and skillfully through the political process.”
— Edward Wenk [225]
(Science Advisor to three US presidents)
hile our modern societies rapidly turn into information societies, powerful players like govern-
ments, secret services and public prosecutors ever more strongly demand for complete surveil-
lance of fax, phone, e-mail, payment transactions and more. However, this thesis advocates to design
the information infrastructures so that they can respect and enforce the legitimate security interests of
ALL participants, be they active users or passive usees1 of the computer systems. So the pleading at
the heart of this thesis is:
As little observability of citizens in every day’s transactions and 
as much security against misuse and fraud as possible. 
This is not an impossible dream, this is a vision that can become reality if citizens are getting more
conscious and demanding rather than getting distracted by the exciting features of today’s applica-
tions. The customers, employers, tax payers, voters, i.e., all individuals of an information society, per-
form numerous transactions with each other and with provider organizations every day. Almost any of
these transactions leaves digital traces about individual clients at the provider’s organization. Since
digital traces are easily accumulated into digital profiles on individual behavior, the privacy of any
individual is at risk. The problem should neither be disregarded as a hobbyhorse of some frustrated
researchers or as the paranoia of some radical dropouts; it is a serious threat to democratic societies.
Privacy threats are insidious for two reasons. (i) They are not easy to quantify because its impacts are
1) The term “usee” describes those whose data is processed by computer systems but who usually do not use these computer
systems themselves.
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      diffuse: What happens if patients face the fact that their medical records including genetic fingerprints
are released or sold to third parties, e.g., employers, insurance companies, pharmaceutical suppliers?
How will citizens (and also small enterprises) react if information about their consuming behavior,
social and political activities is available as digital goods on the Web? It is unrealistic to assume that
conformity to majority opinions would not increase under such conditions. (ii) Privacy threats are eas-
ily overlooked because individuals do not feel to be observed, therefore do not feel to be threatened
individually, and therefore feel little need to defend themselves appropriately. Unlike countries or large
enterprises engaged in information warfare [97], individuals seldom know their observers, can hardly
measure their loss of privacy, are usually not organized and only few are skilled to take appropriate
countermeasures. (iii) Privacy threats are ubiquitous through the installation of video cameras and
other biometric scanning technology. Places of public interest, roads, tunnels, bridges, gas stations,
train stations, airports, and ATM are only a few examples of non-stop video monitoring. The next
generation of public key infrastructures will replace passwords by biometric recognition facilities. A
profound overview of surveillance technologies has been compiled by DuncanCampbell [55] for the
STOA unit of the European Parliament and was presented to the European Parliament. Simson
Garfinkel has published a thorough analysis of privacy threats in the US [115]. 
The threat to privacy is illustrated by an episode in 1996 that has been partially documented at
the Cambridge Workshop on “Personal Medical Information — Security, Engineering, and Ethics” [2].
The British National Health Service (NHS) had proposed to build a UK-wide medical network in order
to increase efficiency of all transactions between General Practitioners (GPs), clinics, hospitals, phar-
macies and other points of care. After serious and persistent requests, it was promised that patient
data should not be sent in clear but only in encrypted form and the NHS as a national organization
had therefore looked for a method that was acceptable to the intelligence community. The NHS was
advised (if not oppressed) to employ an unpublished encryption mechanism called “redpike”. The ser-
vice’s obvious intention was to keep easy access to all data sent along the medical network. Had only
the patients been affected, this proposal supposingly would have been accepted without much noise. In
this case however, many medical doctors have felt not only their patients’ privacy threatened but also
their own, and so the British Medical Association (BMA) started a campaign against the NHS pro-
posal. (The controversy died out later because the NHS did not pursue the original plan further.)
Evidently, anonymity is not an end in itself. In small communities, anonymity can be counterpro-
ductive, and even in large societies it has to be balanced against other legitimate interests like for
example fighting organized crime, terrorism and money laundry. It shall be shown that for not so
small classes of applications fair privacy protecting solutions exist. It must be left to the democratic
process to decide about which technical infrastructures we want to face in the next millennium.iv
           Abstractrganizing the interdependencies within and between communities is one of the ongoing challenges
of mankind. Once organizations are formed, companies run their businesses, and a legal system is
in place, there is an urgent need for procedures to perform legally binding transactions. This in turn
brings up the need for unforgeable documents or tokens of legitimation. Traditional examples are let-
ters and cheques with handwritten signatures or seals, hard-to-counterfeit bills, drivers licences and
passports with hardly removable pictures imprinted, etc. The implementations of legitimations change
as the technological paradigms change, but the need for legitimations persists. In information societies,
many of the traditional implementations are obsolete because they are no longer efficient and often too
costly. In addition, information technology often provides better approximations to the ideal proper-
ties of legitimations, e.g. unforgeability. Electronic commerce is one if not the pioneering area where
the new implementations of legitimations are developed, tested and put into everyday’s practice.
Examples are electronic wallets, phone cards, e-cash, e-tickets, etc.
While an amount of money can be regarded as a legitimation to consume a corresponding portion
of the national gross product, there are also other kinds of legitimations. This work starts by categoriz-
ing them and identifying important examples in real life. Namely, we distinguish personal and coin
legitimations. The former cannot be transferred between holders and the latter cannot be used more
often than a pre-specified limit. Orthogonal to these categories then are privacy requirements. This is
where electronic implementations are really superior to traditional implementations: Not only are they
more efficient, but they can achieve more privacy for holders of legitimations than the conventional
paper based implementations can. Such electronic implementations have been introduced in 1985 by
Chaum [60] as credentials. Holders can get a credential from an issuer and later show it to a verifier
without letting the issuer and verifiers recognize that they have issued and verified a credential of the
same holder (unlinkability). Although several cryptographic mechanisms for credentials have been sug-
gested since, formal definitions have been given only for the special case of electronic cash. We propose
a formal modular framework to define the different categories of credentials sketched above (including
electronic cash). Furthermore, we suggest the first mechanism for personal credentials that can be
shown many times in an unlinkable way. In order to achieve non-transferability, we suggest the use of
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  biometric verification of holders without releasing any biometric data to more or less centralized data-
bases where they could be aggregated, analyzed and re-used in unintended ways.
In addition to privacy of holders, we also consider privacy of issuers of credentials (against verifi-
ers). This turns out to be useful in more complex applications. The final section presents the detailed
design of how compulsory health insurances can be billed without the health insurers even learning
which physician is treating which patient, let alone which patient gets which therapy or medicament.
This way, the trust relationship between patients and physicians can be protected optimally, and it is
nevertheless possible to identify falsely claiming physicians after the fact. vi
      Kurzfassungine ständige Herausforderung jeder Gesellschaft ist es, einen verläßlichen Rahmen für die Bezie-
hungen ihrer Mitglieder (Individuen und Gruppen) herzustellen und aufrechtzuerhalten. Sobald
Organisationen gegründet sind, Firmen ihre Geschäfte betreiben und ein Rechtssystem installiert ist,
werden Verfahren zur rechtsverbindlichen Interaktion benötigt. Dies wiederum erfordert
fälschungssichere Dokumente oder Ausweise. Traditionelle Beispiele sind gesiegelte oder unterschrie-
bene Briefe, unterschriebene Schecks, schwer fälschbare Geldscheine, Führerscheine oder Reisepässe
mit aufgedruckten Passbildern. Die Form der Legitimationen mag sich entsprechend der technologi-
schen Paradigmen einer Gesellschaft verändern und weiterentwickeln, aber die grundsätzliche Notwen-
digkeit von Legitimationen bleibt bestehen. In einer Informationsgesellschaft sind viele der
herkömmlichen, d.h. papiergestützten Formen überholt, weil sie zu ineffizient und oft auch zu teuer
sind. Überdies erlaubt Informationstechnologie häufig bessere Annäherungen an die idealen Eigen-
schaften von Legitimationen, z.B. Unfälschbarkeit. E-Commerce, ist eines wenn nicht sogar das füh-
rende Gebiet, auf dem die zukünftigen Formen von Legitimationen entwickelt, erprobt, und
wahrscheinlich auch flächendeckend eingesetzt werden. Beispiele sind elektronische Brieftaschen, Geld-
karten, e-cash, e-tickets, etc.
Es gibt neben Geld weitere Sorten von Legitimationen2, und die vorliegenden Arbeit beginnt mit
ihrer Klassifizierung illustriert durch praktische Beispiele. Im wesentlichen unterscheiden wir zwischen
persönlichen und Münz-Legitimationen. Erstere können unter Besitzern nicht weitergegeben werden,
während letztere nur begrenzt oft benutzt werden können. Orthogonal zu dieser Unterscheidung
betrachten wir Anonymitätsanforderungen—oder stärker Unverkettbarkeitsanforderungen der Besitzer
von Legitimationen. Auf diesem Gebiet bieten digitale Implementierungen von Legitimationen qualita-
tive Vorteile gegenüber herkömmlichen: Sie sind nicht nur effizienter herzustellen, zu speichern und zu
prüfen, sondern können tatsächlich Unverkettbarkeit der Transaktionen desselben Besitzers erzielen.
Kryptographische Implementierungen sind erstmals 1985 von Chaum [60] untersucht und unter dem
2) Volkswirtschaftlich kann Geld als Legitimation oder Anspruch auf einen entsprechenden Teil des Bruttosozialprodukts
angesehen werden.
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    Begriff Credentials eingeführt worden. Hier kann ein Besitzer sein Credential von einem Anbieter
bekommen und es später einem Dritten (Prüfer) zeigen, ohne daß Anbieter und Prüfer hinterher
erkennen könnten, daß sie mit demselben Besitzer zu tun hatten. Obwohl seitdem mehrere Verfahren
für Credentials vorgeschlagen worden sind, gibt es formale Definitionen bisher nur für den Spezialfall
Münz-Credentials. Wir geben eine formale modulare Definition für alle oben beschriebenen Arten von
Credentials. Weiterhin geben wir die erste Konstruktion für persönliche Credentials, die mehrfach
unverkettbar gezeigt werden können. Um Weitergabe der Credentials zu verhindern, untersuchen wir
den Einsatz biometrischer Erkennungsverfahren, wobei die biometrischen Daten der Credentialbesitzer
nicht in zentrale Datenbanken gelangen können, in denen sie gesammelt, analysiert und in
unerwünschter Weise weiterverwendet werden könnten. 
Über die Unverkettbarkeitsforderungen von Besitzern hinaus betrachten wir hier erstmals auch
Anonymitätsforderungen der Anbieter gegen Prüfer von Credentials. Dies kann in komplexeren
Anwendungsgebieten wünschenswert oder nötig sein. Im letzten Kapitel entwerfen wir detailliert, wie
mit gesetzlichen Krankenversicherungen so abgerechnet werden kann, daß die Versicherer nicht einmal
erfahren, welcher Arzt welchen Versicherten behandelt, geschweige denn welcher Patient welche
Behandlung und welches Medikament bekommt. Auf diese Weise wird das Vertrauensverhältnis zwi-
schen Arzt und Patient optimal geschützt, und dennoch können Ärzte nachträglich identifiziert und
zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, wenn sie nicht erbrachte Leistungen abrechnen oder überhöhte
Gebühren in Rechnung stellen.viii
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